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Abstract 
Complex phenomena such as play, creativity or innovation are familiar, yet diﬃcult 
to describe in a systematic manner. In this short article I propose six necessary con-
ditions for any comprehensive description of play. Against this background I discuss 
my systems-theoretic, constructivist and practice-informed approach to play. 
Keywords: cybernetics; distinctions; game studies; play; systems theory. 
 
Play 
Play is a complex and interesting phenomenon. It is a common experience, yet mysteri-
ous and paradoxical in nature. It is free but functional, frivolous but meaningful, cultural 
(Huizinga, 1955) but pre-human (Burghardt, 2005). From our early childhood we en-
gage in play, but we are far from a firm understanding of it. Various disciplines such as 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, ethology, cognitive science and the humanities 
have made attempts to explain and conceptualize play through numerous conflicting 
theories (Ellis, 1973; Henricks, 2008). Play is also linked to wellbeing, creativity and in-
novation (Bateson & Martin, 2013). However, approaches that attempt to instrumental-
ize play have been met with mixed responses from the community of play thinkers and 
practitioners. Some argue that play should be regarded an autotelic activity, exercised 
for its own sake and not for any extrinsic purposes (Sicart, 2014). Yet designers of games 
and playful experiences1 increasingly make use of experimental findings from psychol-
ogy and cognitive sciences in order to aid them in creating compelling play experiences. 
                                                                  
1 There are various ways to draw distinctions between games (Salen & Zimmerman, 2003, pp. 70–83) and 
play (Salen & Zimmerman, 2003, pp. 300–311); for example, one can observe games as media that are 
particularly suited for forms of play to appear (Luhmann, 2000). 
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Descriptions 
A fundamental theory that would be capable of describing these multiple facets of 
play currently does not exist. This has been problematized (Sutton-Smith, 1997), 
however, a solution has not been proposed so far. I argue that any comprehensive 
description of play needs to meet at least six conditions: 
The first condition is an adequate level of abstraction. The description has to be ab-
stract and general enough to cover the wide range of phenomena that are observable 
as play: free play between children; the ritual of a sports match; non-human (e.g., an-
imal) play; the drama unfolding during a game of chess; metarules emerging from a 
multiplayer online battle; unpleasant, forced, and dark play (Mortensen, Linderoth, & 
Brown, 2015); or the experiential quality of a playful encounter between adults. These 
and many other phenomena have to be considered within a description of play. This 
high grade of abstraction requires a simple, universal foundation. 
The second condition is suﬃcient complexity: the description has to be complex 
enough to account for the complexity of play. Note that this and the previous condi-
tion act in an antagonistic manner in that high abstraction pulls in the direction of 
simplicity, while complexity is required to describe a complex phenomenon. This 
rules out simplistic general explanations in the style of “play is getting rid of surplus 
energy” (Spencer, 1855) or “play is capitalism” (Nash & Penney, 2015). Throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many attempts to explain play by single 
causes have been put forward (Ellis, 1973), a development that can itself be observed 
as an artefact of the social sciences (Luhmann, 2009). 
The third condition is that it has to account for paradoxical and contradictory find-
ings. Is play a biological function to practice useful behavior (Pellis, Pellis, & Bell, 
2010), or is it an ambiguous phenomenon that is best described in the form of seven 
cultural rhetorics (Sutton-Smith, 1997)? One way to make sense of such a contradic-
tion is to include its context in the description. For example, one may choose to not 
only describe the conflicting observations, but also the observers that are involved. 
If animals play and if ethologists postulate play as a biological function, we can ob-
serve (and explain) this fact because ethology is based on functional explanations.2 
Therefore, a clash with, for example, Huizinga (1955), who posited play as deeply 
cultural, can be avoided if we carry the context with us. Again, we have relocated our 
observation from play itself to the scientific system, but we are aware of this shift of 
perspective. When we talk about a theory of play, we talk about a social system that 
is diﬀerent from play, except when we are playing with the theory itself. 
  
                                                                  
2 Maturana and Varela (1980) calls this phenomenon “structural determinism.” 
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From the previous remarks follows the fourth condition: a comprehensive descrip-
tion of play must be transdisciplinary. While acknowledging disciplinary foundations 
and methodologies, it has to provide a critical analysis of traditional approaches and 
must be able to transcend them (Punt & Blassnigg, 2013). This means that there can-
not be all-encompassing, mono-thematic explanations that are rooted within a spe-
cific discipline or theory like biology, child development or Marxism. 
The fifth condition is Anschlussfähigkeit (connective capability), a term borrowed 
from Luhmann’s theory that denotes an important characteristic of social systems. 
Such a system, which operates with communication, ceases to exist when there are 
no follow-up events responding to previous events. A conversation dies, an institu-
tion gets closed, a theory forgotten. To enhance the probability that communication 
can continue, a comprehensive description of play must therefore ensure its connec-
tive capability (for example by continuously publishing articles). However, the ne-
cessity of further communication does not imply favorable assessment: critique—
even blunt rebuﬀ—is an appropriate continuation for descriptive discourses. 
I propose a sixth condition: the description has to bridge theory and practice.3 A de-
scription in this sense includes theory and practice: experimental methods, proto-
typing, play and game design practice, critique, computational models, speculative 
design, experiential aspects. Thus, a description can be a demonstration, an interac-
tion and an experience. We can actually learn about play by playing. 
 
Playful Systems 
Through my PhD project “Designing Playful Systems,”4 I am developing a description 
of play that is abstract, complex, observer-dependent, transdisciplinary, and that 
bridges theory and practice (Straeubig, 2016). 
In particular, I observe play through the lens of distinctions (Straeubig, 2015), based 
on the conceptual work of Spencer-Brown (2008), Maturana and Varela (1980) and 
Luhmann (1996). Distinctions serve as the universal building blocks required by the 
first condition. Examples are system/environment, theory/practice, human/ma-
chine, play/work or external/internal purpose. 
My approach draws heavily from the foundations of Luhmann’s general systems the-
ory. While Luhmann himself focused on working out a comprehensive theory of so-
cial systems, the general principles can also be applied to psychic and biological 
aspects of play. In other words, the theory can provide suﬃcient complexity to de-
scribe every aspect of play (second condition).  
                                                                  
3 For this reason, I have used the term ‘description’ instead of ‘theory.’ 
4 Available at http://www.cognovo.eu/project-9 
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Furthermore, Luhmann’s theory acknowledges the fundamental role of the observer 
(third condition). The introduction of the observer into system-theoretic thinking 
took place during the second half of the last century with constructivist theories and 
the so-called “second-order” cybernetics (Glanville, 2002). At the price of binning no-
tions of “objective truth,” paradoxes and contradictions could be embraced from now 
on without an imminent collapse of the observing systems.5 
In order to make sense of the multifaceted nature of play, I draw from the wide range 
of disciplines that have contributed to research in this area (Straeubig, Hsu, Oztop, & 
Taranu, 2016) as well as from the relatively young fields of play and game studies 
(Mäyrä et al., 2015). This approach observes those disciplines as social systems (sub-
systems of academia) while re-producing its own inherent mode of observation 
through autopoiesis (Bishop & Al-Rifaie, 2016). Metaphorically speaking, it provides 
a system-theoretic “glue” through the method of distinction (fourth condition). 
At Oﬀ the Lip 2017, I gave a short talk about the topics of this paper and demonstrated 
a work-in-progress playful system, re-implemented from (Karpathy, 2014). The sys-
tem is based on a reinforcement learning algorithm that draws distinctions from exter-
nal rewards (Mnih et al., 2013). In this demonstration, theory and practice informed 
each other and both were exposed to the  academic discourse (sixth condition). A play-
ful system, I conclude, is one that draws distinctions for its own sake (Ghahramani, 
2004), mixed with motivating rewards from the environment (Arulkumaran, 
Deisen⁠roth, Brundage, & Bharath, 2017). This will be elaborated in future work, thus 
contrib⁠uting to the connective capability (fifth condition) of this work. This article, the 
discussions during the conference, the presentation I delivered, the demonstration and 
the responses I received—all increase the surface for communicative acts to follow. 
However, a final answer to the question of whether my approach to play is 
“200mmett200ssfähig” has to be established in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
Currently, the problem of how we make sense of complex phenomena that span 
brains, minds and social systems remains unsolved. If we aim to describe cognitive 
innovation “from cell to society” (Gummerum & Denham, 2014), if we want to give 
adequate accounts of creativity (Colton & Wiggins, 2012), we need a framework to 
do so. In this article, I have proposed six requirements for any comprehensive de-
scription of these phenomena and demonstrated how I apply those principles to play. 
 
                                                                  
5 Pickering (2011) oﬀers explanations why cybernetics has lost in importance over time, but I believe that 
the final word concerning this issue has not been spoken yet. 
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